History of Turkey

The earliest cultures of Anatolia (10,000–1500 BC)

Anatolia, modern-day Turkey, has some of the world’s oldest settlements. Göbekli Tepe, built around 10,000 BC, is the earliest known temple complex, predating Stonehenge by millennia. By 6500 BC, farming communities like Çatalhöyük thrived, with tightly packed mudbrick houses, obsidian tools, and pottery featuring Mother Goddess figures.

The Chalcolithic Age brought fortified settlements, especially in the southeast, where frequent conflicts left behind signs of destruction. In central and western Anatolia, people crafted burnished pottery and religious idols.

By the Bronze Age (3000 BC), local rulers controlled fortified cities. The royal tombs of Alacahöyük reveal advanced metalwork, golden jewelry, and ceremonial artifacts. Trade flourished—Troy connected Anatolia with Greece and the Aegean islands, exchanging metals and jewelry for lapis lazuli and ivory. The famous ‘Priam’s Treasure’ comes from this era.

The Hatti emerged in the second millennium BC, later absorbed into the Hittite Empire. Assyrian merchants set up trade colonies, dealing in textiles, tin, copper, and luxury pottery. Through war and commerce, Anatolia became a major force in the ancient world.

The Hittites (2000–1200 BC)

The Hittites were Anatolia’s first great empire. Emerging around 2000 BC, they established their Old Kingdom by 1650 BC, with Hattuşaş as their capital. This vast city, founded by Hattusilis I, sat atop a gorge with a massive citadel. Unlike Syrian art, which borrowed heavily from Mesopotamian and Egyptian styles, Hittite art remained distinct — best seen in rock-cut reliefs of warrior gods and mythical creatures.

Despite their imperial ambitions, the Hittites valued diplomacy, often sealing alliances through royal marriages. Their legal system was unusually humane, and rulers were bound by a constitution. The empire, weakened by succession struggles, was revived by Tudhaliya II (c. 1430 BC). Around this time, the Mitanni, a rising power in Mesopotamia, were defeated by Suppiluliumas (1385–1345 BC).

Under Muwatallis, the Hittites proved their military might by clashing with Ramses II of Egypt at the Battle of Kadesh (1274 BC) — one of history’s largest chariot battles. A peace treaty followed, sealed by a royal marriage. But threats remained. The Hurrians seized Cilicia, and on the west coast, Troy rose as a rival to the Greeks. Both Troy and the Hittite Empire collapsed around 1200 BC, possibly due to war, famine, or invading Sea Peoples.

The post-Hittite Era (1200–600 BC)

With the fall of the Hittite Empire around 1200 BC, Anatolia entered a Dark Age. Waves of Sea Peoples from the Aegean and Balkans devastated cities, but remnants of Hittite culture endured in smaller regional powers.

Key civilizations after the Hittites

• Neo-Hittite city-states (1200–700 BC) – Formed in the southeast, these small kingdoms preserved Hittite traditions and influenced early Greek art. They fell to the Arameans and Assyrians in the 8th century BC.
• Urartu (860–600 BC) – A Hurrian-descended kingdom based around Lake Van. Urartians built advanced citadels, tunnel systems, and metalworks, trading bronze goods as far as Greece. The Assyrians eventually halted their expansion.
• Phrygia (c. 800–695 BC) – Centered at Gordion, the Phrygians thrived under King Midas. Their rule ended when Cimmerian horsemen sacked the city, leading Midas to his legendary suicide.
• Lycia (Iron Age–500s BC) – Possibly the Lukka of Hittite records, the Lycians settled the southwest coast, developing a distinct culture.
• Lydia (8th–6th century BC) – Dominated western Anatolia from Sardis, influencing Greek Ionia and Persia with their wealth, luxury goods, and elegant art.

The Persians and Alexander (546–323 BC)

The Lydians ruled western Anatolia until King Croesus was defeated by Cyrus the Great (546 BC). Persia established control, appointing satraps to collect tribute, while Greek coastal cities suffered under Phoenician-favored trade policies. A Greek revolt (499 BC), led by Miletus, failed due to weak mainland support.

Persian wars and Greek resistance

Persia faced repeated Greek resistance:

• Battle of Marathon (490 BC) – Darius I was defeated.
• Battle of Salamis (480 BC) – Xerxes’ fleet was crushed.
• Battle of Plataea (479 BC) – Persian land forces suffered defeat.

Persia retained Anatolia, but Greek cities gained autonomy. By the 4th century BC, rulers like Mausolus of Halikarnassos held quasi-independence.

Alexander’s Conquest (334–323 BC)

In 334 BC, Alexander the Great invaded Anatolia, defeating Persia at Issos (333 BC) and sweeping through the region. After reaching India, he died (323 BC), and his empire was divided. Anatolia eventually fell under Roman rule (133 BC).

Roman rule in Anatolia (133 BC–395 AD)

Roman control over Asia Minor began in 133 BC, but it was far from peaceful. The most serious challenge came from Mithridates VI of Pontus (110–63 BC), a cunning ruler who led multiple wars against Rome. After years of conflict, he fled to Armenia, where the Romans, wary of the Parthians, allowed the kingdom to remain as a buffer state.

Pax Romana and imperial influence

• Augustus (27 BC–AD 14) ushered in peace, leading to economic and cultural prosperity.
• Hadrian (117–138 AD) left his mark with grand city projects, many still visible in ruins today.
• St. Paul (1st century AD) spread Christianity across Anatolia, leaving behind biblical writings.

The division of the Empire

• Diocletian (AD 284) split Rome into two administrative units, each with an emperor and successor.
• Constantine (AD 306–337) emerged victorious from civil war, moving the eastern capital to Byzantium (renamed Constantinople).
• Christianity gained imperial support, officially becoming the state religion by the late 4th century.
• Theodosius I (379–395 AD) was the last emperor of a united Rome. Upon his death, the empire permanently split into Latin-speaking Rome and Greek-speaking Byzantium, setting the stage for the Byzantine era.

The Byzantine Empire (330–1453 AD)

While the Western Roman Empire crumbled under barbarian invasions, the Eastern Byzantine Empire held firm. Wealthier and more populous, it had stronger rulers and better defenses — but it was plagued by religious divisions. The southeastern provinces (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Armenia) resented Constantinople’s control and embraced Monophysitism, a doctrine rejected by the capital. Persecution of these "heretics" only deepened the divide, culminating in the Great Schism (1054) between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism.

The rise and fall of Byzantium

• Justinian (527–565) briefly restored Roman glory, but after his death, the empire lost Italy, Spain, and the east to Lombards, Goths, Persians, and Arabs. By 711, Byzantium was reduced to the Balkans, parts of Italy, and Anatolia, becoming increasingly Greek in language and culture.
• Macedonian Dynasty (867–1056): Founded by Basil I, this era saw legal reforms, military victories, and economic prosperity. Basil II (‘Bulgar-Slayer’) expanded east and dominated the Balkans.
• 11th Century Decline: Civil wars between bureaucrats and generals weakened the empire. The army relied on mercenaries, and Byzantine peasants sank into serfdom. The Normans invaded the Balkans, while Venetians and Genoese exploited Byzantine trade.
• The Fourth Crusade (1204): Western greed led to the brutal sacking of Constantinople, crippling Byzantium.
• Final Years (1261–1453): Despite brief revivals under the Komnenos and Paleologos dynasties, Byzantium fought a losing battle against Ottoman expansion. The empire’s last great legacy was its sacred art and architecture, still visible across Anatolia and the Balkans.

The arrival of the Turks (11th–13th century)

By the 11th century, the Turks, originally nomads from Mongolia, had migrated westward and converted to Islam under Arab influence. One group, the Seljuks, settled in Baghdad, while the more unruly Turcoman tribes remained nomadic and unpredictable. Eager to control them, the Seljuks redirected these warriors into Byzantine Anatolia.

In 1071, Alp Arslan defeated Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV at Manzikert, opening the region to Turkish settlement. While Byzantium, weakened by internal struggles, managed to hold parts of the west, the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum, based in Konya, took over central Anatolia.

Despite its military roots, the sultanate became a center of culture and trade, building kervansarays, medreses, and mosques, and sheltering thinkers like Rumi, founder of the Mevlevî dervish order. However, in 1243, the Mongols crushed the Seljuks at Köse Dağ, reducing them to vassals. By 1300, both Byzantium and the Seljuks had lost control of Anatolia, leaving the region in the hands of Turcoman warlords. Among them, a small principality led by Osman I would soon rise — the Ottoman Empire was on the horizon.

The rise of the Ottomans (13th–15th century)

Following the Seljuk collapse, Anatolia fractured into Turcoman emirates, including the small Ottoman emirate in Söğüt. Under Osman I, it expanded, and by the 1330s, Orhan had captured Bursa and İznik, establishing Ottoman rule in northwest Anatolia.

With Byzantine power fading, Anatolia’s culture became a hybrid of Greek and Turkish influences, with Sufi orders blending Islamic and Christian traditions. The Ottomans formalized the devşirme system, training Christian boys as elite janissaries — both warriors and administrators.

In the mid-14th century, the Ottomans crossed into Thrace, taking Edirne (1362) and defeating Serbs at Kosovo (1389). Bayezid I crushed the Crusaders at Nicopolis (1396) but was defeated by Timur at Ankara (1402), briefly halting Ottoman expansion.

The fall of Constantinople

After a seven-week siege, Mehmed II (‘the Conqueror’) took Constantinople (1453), cementing Ottoman rule as the successors of Byzantium and launching a global empire.

The Ottoman Golden Age (1453–1566)

After capturing Constantinople, Mehmed II (‘the Conqueror’) transformed it into Istanbul, a true imperial capital. He repopulated the city, built Topkapı Palace, and organized non-Muslims into millets, self-governing religious communities led by patriarchs or rabbis. This system ensured relative religious freedom, far more than in contemporary Europe.

Mehmed continued expanding the empire, conquering the Peloponnese, the Black Sea coast, and the Balkans, including Bosnia and Albania. His successor, Bayezid II (‘the Pious’), strengthened Ottoman naval power, enlisting pirates, Greek renegades, and Italian mercenaries. In 1492, he welcomed Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal, integrating them into Ottoman society.

Selim I and the Ottoman Caliphate

Selim I (‘the Grim’) seized power in 1512, imposing religious orthodoxy. He crushed Shi’ite opposition in Anatolia and defeated Persia at Çaldıran (1514). Instead of pressing into Persia, he turned south, conquering Egypt and Mesopotamia (1516–1517). By bringing the caliph from Cairo to Istanbul, he made the Ottoman sultan the leader of Sunni Islam.

Süleyman the Magnificent (1520–1566)

Under Süleyman (‘the Magnificent’), the empire reached its peak. He captured Belgrade (1521), Budapest (1526), and Rhodes (1522), extending Ottoman rule deep into Europe. Though he failed to take Vienna (1529) or drive the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean, Ottoman fleets dominated the Mediterranean, led by legendary admirals like Barbarossa. The failed Siege of Malta (1565) marked the end of Ottoman naval supremacy.

Süleyman also secured the 1536 Franco-Ottoman treaty, granting France trading privileges and legal exemptions. Over time, these Capitulations eroded Ottoman sovereignty, as other European powers gained similar privileges, weakening the empire from within. Yet, in the 16th century, the Ottomans stood as the most powerful empire in the world.

Centuries of Ottoman decline (1570s–1790s)

Ottoman decline is often traced to Selim II (‘the Sot’), whose weakness led to a century of ineffective sultans. Murad IV (ruthless) and Ahmed II (a reformist) were the only rulers who tried to halt the empire’s decay. By the 17th century, power shifted to the harem and grand viziers, while heirs were locked in the Kafes (‘Cage’), emerging unfit to rule.

Internal decay

• End of meritocracy: The devşirme system faded, and the janissaries became corrupt, enlisting for pay rather than duty.
• Hereditary corruption: Bureaucratic offices and timar lands became hereditary, creating local warlords (derebeys).
• Economic collapse: Inflation and European sea trade weakened Ottoman commerce.

Military decline and European rise

• Vienna siege fails (1683) → Austria pushes the Ottomans back.
• Russia defeats the empire (1774, 1792) → Gains Black Sea access and Orthodox protector rights.

By the late 18th century, the Ottomans relied on diplomacy, not strength, to maintain their borders.

Reforms and the Young Ottomans (1789–1876)

Selim III (1789–1808) launched the Nizam-i-Cedid (‘New Order’), hiring European advisors to modernize the army. This angered the janissaries and ulema, who overthrew and killed him. His successor, Mahmud II, acted cautiously — until the Greek War of Independence (1821–1830) and Mehmet Ali’s rebellion weakened Ottoman control. The 1833 Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi gave Russia control over the Bosphorus.

At home, Mahmud abolished the janissaries (1826) in the ‘Auspicious Incident’, introduced European-style military training, and replaced the turban with the fez. His son, Abdülmecid (1839–1861), expanded reforms under Tanzimat (‘Reorganization’), granting:

• Legal equality for Muslims and non-Muslims.
• Tax and anti-corruption reforms.
• Secular schools and newspapers.

Under Abdülaziz (1861–1876), extravagant spending fueled opposition from the Young Ottomans, led by Namık Kemal. In 1876, they deposed Abdülaziz, but his successor Murad V was unstable. Abdülhamid II took power, promising — but soon abandoning — constitutional rule.

Abdülhamid and the Young Turks (1876–1908)

Sultan Abdülhamid II initially upheld constitutional rule, overseeing the first Ottoman parliament. However, his timing couldn’t have been worse. In 1877, Russia invaded the Caucasus and the Balkans, pushing a pan-Slavic agenda. The Ottomans suffered heavy losses, confirmed by the harsh Treaty of San Stefano (1878). The Conference of Berlin softened the blow but still saw Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia gain independence, Bulgaria reduced in size, Bosnia occupied by Austria, and Cyprus taken by Britain.

Displeased with the parliament’s criticism of his policies, Abdülhamid dissolved it in 1878 and established an absolute police state. Press censorship, spies, and telegraph surveillance became the norm. He promoted Islamic unity as a counter to nationalism but failed to stop further losses — Tunis (1881) to France and Egypt (1882) to Britain. His rule also saw the 1895–96 Armenian pogroms, where 150,000 Armenians were killed in response to rising nationalist movements.

Despite resisting political reform, Abdülhamid embraced Western technology. German-backed railways, industrial investment, and a Public Debt Administration modernized the economy. He expanded secular schools and technical education, though only within strict ideological limits. Ironically, this educated elite would soon rise against him.

Nationalism and the Balkan wars (1909–1914)

After the Young Turks’ revolution (1909), three competing ideologies shaped the empire’s future:

• Ottomanism: A multi-ethnic federal empire with equal rights for all.
• Pan-Islamism: Reviving Abdülhamid’s vision of uniting Muslims under Ottoman rule.
• Pan-Turanism: Advocating unity among Turkic peoples, later evolving into Turkism, prioritizing Anatolian Turkish Muslims.

Though Turkism prevailed, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) became increasingly authoritarian by 1912, suppressing opposition.

The Balkan Wars and the rise of the CUP Junta

The empire faced external threats. Italy seized Libya (1911) and the Dodecanese Islands (1912), while the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece) nearly reached Istanbul (1912). Enraged by Ottoman failures, CUP officers staged a coup (1913), assassinating the war minister and consolidating power under Enver, Talat, and Cemal Paşa.

In early 1914, the new rulers deported or killed nearly 500,000 Greek Orthodox, setting a precedent for further ethnic purges.

World War I and the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1914–1918)

By 1914, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) had embraced Turkish nationalism, abandoning pan-Ottoman ideals. Though many Ottomans favored neutrality, Enver Paşa secretly allied with Germany. Britain further angered the public by seizing two Ottoman battleships, and Germany capitalized by gifting two warships — whose German commander immediately bombed Russian ports. By November, the Ottomans were at war.

Military disaster and Gallipoli

Fighting on five fronts, the Ottomans suffered catastrophic defeats. Enver lost an entire army against Russia (1914–1915), and Arab subjects sided with Britain, leading to losses in Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia. However, at Gallipoli (1915–1916), Ottoman forces blocked British and French forces from reaching Istanbul, thanks largely to Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk).

The end of the Empire

On October 30, 1918, the Ottomans surrendered. The Allies occupied Istanbul, and the CUP leaders fled and were later assassinated. The empire was gone, but Turkey’s war for independence was about to begin.

The struggle for independence (1919–1923)

After the Ottoman defeat, the Allies occupied Istanbul and carved up Anatolia — the French took the southeast, Italians the southwest, and Greeks seized İzmir, aiming for a ‘Greater Greece’. Sultan Mehmed VI, desperate to keep his throne, complied with Allied demands and dissolved parliament.

Mustafa Kemal and the Nationalist Movement

Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal, the only undefeated Ottoman commander, traveled to Samsun (May 19, 1919) and organized the Nationalist resistance. The Grand National Assembly (GNA) was established in Ankara (April 23, 1920), openly defying the sultan.

The Greco-Turkish War (1921–1922)

Greek forces advanced but were halted at İnönü (1921) and decisively defeated at Sakarya and Dumlupınar (1922). The Greeks retreated, burning İzmir behind them.

The fall of the Sultanate and Treaty of Lausanne (1923)

With victory secured, the sultanate was abolished (1922), and Mehmed VI fled. At the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), Turkey’s modern borders were secured, paving the way for the Turkish Republic.

The young Republic (1923–1938)

On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) declared the Republic of Turkey, naming Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) as president and İsmet İnönü as prime minister. The capital moved to Ankara, symbolizing a break from the Ottoman past. In 1924, Atatürk abolished the caliphate, exiled the Ottoman dynasty, banned dervish orders, and seized religious foundations.

Crushing opposition and centralizing power

Atatürk suppressed dissent early on. After a Kurdish revolt (1925), he banned the opposition Progressive Republican Party (PRP) and executed rebels. A 1926 assassination plot led to further purges, eliminating former CUP leaders.

Economy and foreign policy

The 1929 crash worsened an already struggling economy. State-funded industrialization boosted railways, steel, and mining, but agriculture remained neglected, deepening Kurdish poverty. Turkey remained neutral in foreign affairs, though it secured Hatay (1936) from French-controlled Syria.

Atatürk died in 1938, leaving behind a modern, secular Turkey, though his economic model faded over

World War II and its aftermath (1939–1950)

After Atatürk’s death, İsmet İnönü became president. His Hatay policy succeeded when France allowed Turkey to annex the region (1939), hoping for Turkish support against Germany. Turkey signed an alliance with Britain and France but remained neutral after France fell (1940). Convinced of a German victory, Turkey signed a ‘Friendship Treaty’ with Nazi Germany (1941), ensuring non-belligerence.

Despite neutrality, military mobilization caused economic hardship. The Varlık Vergisi (Wealth Tax, 1942) unfairly targeted Armenian, Greek, and Jewish businesses, leading to property seizures and labor camps. It was repealed in 1944 but harmed minority relations.

With Germany collapsing, Turkey declared war in 1945 to secure UN membership but failed to stop Soviet demands for Kars and the straits. Seeking protection, Turkey aligned with the US (1946), later joining NATO and fighting in Korea.

The rise of democracy

Discontent with one-party rule led to the Democrat Party (DP) formation (1946). In 1950, the DP won elections, ending RPP rule. Celâl Bayar became president, and Adnan Menderes took over as prime minister.

Populist government and growing instability (1950–1960)

The Democrat Party (DP), under Adnan Menderes, quickly reversed some of Atatürk’s secular reforms. In 1950, after a 17-year ban, the call to prayer in Arabic was reinstated, triggering a revival of fez-wearing, polygamy, and Arabic script use in rural areas where Kemalist reforms had barely taken hold.

Economically, Menderes opened Turkey to foreign trade and investment, ending decades of state-controlled stagnation. However, much of this growth was based on unsustainable borrowing, state-backed projects, and patronage networks. His personal vanity was fed by adoring peasants, who sacrificed livestock in his honor and named their sons after him.

Economic decline and political repression

Early bumper harvests masked economic problems, but by 1954, debt and trade deficits soared. The Turkish lira’s black-market value collapsed, and inflation became a fixture of Turkish life. Instead of addressing criticism, the DP cracked down on dissent, dissolving opposition parties in 1953, passing repressive press laws, and rigging elections in 1957.

The government also tacitly supported anti-Greek pogroms (1955), worsening Turkey’s international reputation. By 1960, the country was deeply divided — peasants still backed Menderes, but the urban elite and military viewed his rule as corrupt and dangerous. The stage was set for intervention.

First military coup and the 1960s (1960–1969)

Frustrated with Democrat Party (DP) rule, the military staged a coup on May 27, 1960, announced by Colonel Alparslan Türkeş. The coup was swift and bloodless; Adnan Menderes, Celâl Bayar, and DP leaders were jailed.

For 16 months, Turkey was ruled by the National Unity Committee (NUC) under General Cemal Gürsel. A new constitution, more liberal than its predecessor, passed a 1961 referendum with 62% approval, revealing lingering DP support. Elections followed, producing a coalition between the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and Justice Party (JP), with İsmet İnönü as prime minister.

Political and social upheaval

The executions of Menderes and two ministers (1961) backfired, fueling JP support. Coup attempts (1962, 1963) failed, but political instability persisted. Cyprus tensions (1964) nearly led to war with Greece, straining US-Turkey relations. By 1968, leftist and right-wing militants clashed, while JP leader Süleyman Demirel struggled to control rising violence and economic instability.

The ‘Memorandum coup’ and the 1970s (1971–1980)

On March 12, 1971, the military issued a memorandum, forcing Süleyman Demirel to resign. Unlike 1960, this ‘coup by memorandum’ kept parliament intact but imposed martial law, leading to mass arrests and crackdowns on dissent. A technocratic government followed but soon collapsed, and elections in 1973 brought a coalition between Bülent Ecevit (RPP) and Necmettin Erbakan (Islamist NSP).

In July 1974, Turkey invaded northern Cyprus after a Greek-backed coup on the island, leading to a permanent division. Ecevit resigned, and Demirel returned until 1977.

By the late 1970s, political violence escalated, with 3,000 annual deaths from leftist-rightist clashes. Entire Istanbul neighborhoods became faction-controlled. In 1978, MHP-led Sunni mobs massacred Alevis in Maraş, while the army crushed an Alevi commune in Fatsa. Demirel’s martial law (1979) failed to restore order, and by 1980, Turkey was on the verge of another coup.

The 1980 coup and its aftermath

On September 12, 1980, Turkey’s military staged a coup, with US backing, amid Cold War tensions following the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Turks initially welcomed the coup, as it ended rampant political violence. However, unlike previous coups, power remained with a junta of senior generals — the National Security Council (NSC) — delaying a return to civilian rule.

The NSC dissolved all political parties, detained leaders, and banned trade unions and NGOs. While some right-wing extremists faced trials, the left bore the brunt of purges, arrests, and show trials. The military crushed labor unions and universities, placing campuses under a new Higher Education Council (YÖK).

In 1982, the junta imposed a highly restrictive constitution, rolling back 1960s-era freedoms. A rigged referendum ratified it with 90% approval, also electing General Kenan Evren as president — without opposition or debate. Civilian rule had returned, but democracy remained crippled.

Return to civilian rule: The ANAP era (1983–1991)

Despite strict military oversight, Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP) won the 1983 elections, defeating the junta’s preferred candidates. ANAP was a broad coalition of economic liberals, conservatives, and Islamists, mirroring Özal himself — a devout Muslim, former Islamist politician, and admirer of Western capitalism, particularly the Texan model.

Economic boom and corruption

Özal’s economic liberalization boosted exports and GDP growth (6%), but also fueled inflation, foreign debt, and corruption. A new provincial elite emerged, wealthy but often indifferent to Western governance standards. Universities, under strict YÖK control, became apolitical technical institutions.

Rising tensions: Islam, Kurds, and foreign relations

By the late 1980s, Islamic influence expanded, with mandatory religious education and Saudi-funded vakıfs, aimed at countering Iranian fundamentalism. Meanwhile, Kurdish separatism intensified as the PKK launched attacks, met with brutal state crackdowns.

Relations with Greece remained tense over Cyprus and Aegean disputes, while in 1989, Bulgaria expelled 300,000 ethnic Turks, prompting a refugee crisis.

Human rights concerns

Despite advocating Turkish minority rights abroad, Turkey’s domestic human rights record worsened — torture, censorship, and political prosecutions were rampant. Özal, though charismatic, proved thin-skinned, frequently suing critics for libel.

Özal as president (1989–1993)

By the late 1980s, Turgut Özal’s ANAP was declining due to hyperinflation, nepotism, and corruption. Despite becoming Turkey’s second civilian president (1989), he continued to control ANAP, choosing Yıldırım Akbulut, a weak yes-man, as prime minister, only to undermine him repeatedly.

The Gulf War and Turkey’s strategic role

Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait reinforced Turkey’s geopolitical importance. Özal aligned with the US, allowing coalition forces to use İncirlik and Diyarbakır airbases, shutting down Iraqi oil pipelines, and backing a Kurdish ‘safe haven’ — securing a US guarantee against Kurdish independence.

1991 elections and political shifts

The 1991 elections, Turkey’s fairest ever, saw Süleyman Demirel’s True Path Party (DYP) win, forming a coalition with the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP). Promises of free speech quickly faltered when Kurdish MPs refused to take the loyalty oath, sparking backlash.

Özal, increasingly at odds with parliament, delayed signing bills and faced impeachment rumors. His sudden death on April 17, 1993, sparked conspiracy theories of a ‘deep state’ assassination. Despite his arrogance and self-promotion, Özal remains one of Turkey’s most transformative leaders since Atatürk.

After Özal: Political and economic chaos (1993–1995)

Following Turgut Özal’s sudden death (1993), Süleyman Demirel became president, while Tansu Çiller, a US-educated economist, became Turkey’s first female prime minister. Initially well-received for her telegenic appeal and assertiveness, she quickly proved incompetent and corrupt.

Escalating conflict and economic crisis

Çiller deferred to military hardliners on the Kurdish issue, leading to soaring violence in eastern Turkey. The latest pro-Kurdish party (DEP) was banned, and inflation hit 120% before dipping to 80%. Corruption scandals engulfed every party, with Çiller herself named among the world’s ten most corrupt politicians (AP, 1996).

The EU Customs Union

One bright spot was the 1995 EU customs union. However, critics noted that Turkey forfeited import duties without gaining freedom of movement for Turks in Europe. Despite no real progress on EU membership, the government framed it as a major success.

By 1995, Çiller’s coalition collapsed, prompting December elections amid widespread public discontent.

The rise and fall of Refah (1995–1999)

In a political earthquake, the Islamist Refah Party (RP) won the December 1995 elections, backed by urban poor, devout Kurds, and voters disillusioned with mainstream parties. Facing corruption investigations, Tansu Çiller (DYP) struck a deal with Refah, securing immunity in exchange for a coalition. Necmettin Erbakan became Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister, with Çiller as deputy.

The 1997 ‘Soft Coup’

The military-dominated National Security Council (NSC), wary of Islamist influence, pressured Erbakan to resign in June 1997, replacing him with an ANAP–DSP coalition. In 1998, the Constitutional Court banned Refah, accusing it of undermining secularism.

The rise of Erdoğan

Islamists regrouped as the Virtue Party (FP), but in 1998, Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was jailed for four months over a speech — though he had merely quoted Ziya Gökalp, a nationalist poet. His pragmatism and governance in Istanbul made him a rising star, despite elite resistance.

Political turmoil continues

As Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP) faced corruption charges, his coalition collapsed (1998). The April 1999 elections produced a weak DSP-led coalition, as Turkey remained politically unstable.

Earthquake and economic meltdown (1999–2002)

On August 17, 1999, a catastrophic earthquake devastated eastern Marmara, killing nearly 20,000. Many died in poorly built tower blocks, exposing rampant corruption in local zoning and construction. The government and army faced harsh criticism for their chaotic response. Ironically, the disaster improved Greek-Turkish relations, as Greek aid teams were first on the scene. By December 1999, Greece dropped its objections to Turkish EU accession, making Turkey an official EU candidate.

The 2001 economic crisis

A banking collapse in early 2001 led to a full-scale financial meltdown. The Turkish lira was free-floated, causing inflation to skyrocket and wages to plummet. The crisis forced IMF-backed reforms under World Bank economist Kemal Derviş.

The rise of the AKP

In June 2001, the Virtue Party (Fazilet) was banned, but its successor, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, quickly emerged. By 2002, with PM Bülent Ecevit incapacitated, the economy shrinking (–8%), and political chaos, Turkey was IMF’s biggest debtor. However, last-minute EU-driven reforms abolished the death penalty and expanded press and minority rights.

Start of the AKP era (2002–2005)

Amid political and economic chaos, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) won a landslide victory on 3 November 2002, securing 34% of the vote and forming Turkey’s first majority government since 1987. Only one other party, the CHP, entered parliament, as all others failed to clear the 10% threshold.

Early reforms and EU aspirations

Despite secularist fears of an Islamist agenda, the AKP stabilized the economy and aggressively pursued EU membership reforms, enacting 36 changes to meet the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ — a more determined effort than any previous secular government.

Iraq War and terrorism

In 2003, Turkey refused to let the US use its territory for the Iraq invasion, straining Turkish-American relations. Fears of Kurdish independence and terrorism proved valid when, in November 2003, al-Qaeda-linked Kurdish militants bombed Istanbul synagogues, the British consulate, and HSBC Bank, killing 55.

Cyprus and EU accession talks

In 2004, Turkish Cypriots backed a UN reunification plan, but Greek Cypriots rejected it, then joined the EU anyway, frustrating Ankara. Despite this, EU accession talks formally began on 3 October 2005. A mixed EU report praised Turkey’s economic progress but flagged human rights and military-civilian tensions. Yet, for the first time in decades, inflation fell to single digits.

AKP’s second term (2007–2011)

In 2007, Turkey was rocked by the assassination of Hrant Dink, an Armenian-Turkish journalist, by an ultranationalist. That same year, AKP co-founder Abdullah Gül was nominated for president, sparking military opposition — his wife wore a headscarf, a symbol of Islamization to secularists. The military posted an online warning (the ‘e-coup’), and millions protested. But in the July 2007 elections, the AKP won 47%, forcing the military to back down.

Tensions and economic struggles

With the CHP losing ground to the far-right MHP, polarization deepened. The AKP lifted the university headscarf ban, leading to a near-ban of the party in 2008. Meanwhile, EU accession stalled, and the 2008 global financial crisis hit hard — unemployment rose above 16%.

Challenging the military and Israel

In 2010, Erdoğan passed laws allowing military officers to be tried in civilian courts, weakening the military’s grip. A referendum (58% approval) further curtailed military power. Relations with Israel collapsed when Israeli forces killed nine Turks aboard the Mavi Marmara (2010), sinking ties between the two nations.

The AKP’s dominance and growing turmoil (2011–2016)

In June 2011, the AKP won a third consecutive term, taking 50% of the vote — an unprecedented feat. Although its parliamentary seats declined, Turkey’s economic growth and stability fueled its popularity.

Foreign policy and the Arab Spring

Turkey’s ‘zero problems with neighbors’ strategy collapsed as the Arab Spring (2011) reshaped the region. Turkey backed Syrian rebels, straining ties with Assad’s regime. Refugees flooded in, and tensions spiked after Syria shot down a Turkish jet (2012).

Domestic crackdowns and Erdoğan’s power grab

By 2013, AKP’s authoritarian shift was evident. The Gezi Park protests were violently repressed, fueling Islamization fears. A 2014 corruption scandal implicated Erdoğan’s allies, triggering mass purges of police and judiciary tied to Fethullah Gülen.

2015 elections, Kurdish Conflict, and terrorism

After losing its majority (June 2015), Erdoğan forced snap elections (November 2015), regaining power. The Kurdish peace process collapsed, and Turkey faced PKK insurgency and ISIS bombings. Amid press crackdowns, Turkey struck an EU migrant deal. By 2016, Turkey was in domestic and regional turmoil.

The coup and its aftermath (2016–2021)

On the night of July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish military launched a coup attempt, seizing key sites in Istanbul and Ankara. By dawn, however, the coup had failed — Erdoğan’s supporters flooded the streets, confronting soldiers, and loyalist forces regained control. For Erdoğan, the failed coup was a ‘gift from God’, giving him the pretext for an unprecedented purge.

The crackdown: Gülenists and beyond

Blaming the Gülen movement (Hizmet) — his former allies — Erdoğan labeled them the ‘Fethullah Terror Organization’ (FETO) and demanded Fethullah Gülen’s extradition from the US. A state of emergency was declared, launching a sweeping purge:

• 180,000 people detained, including 7,000 senior military officers.
• 143 journalists arrested, making Turkey the world’s worst jailer of journalists at the time.
• Media outlets, universities, local governments, and NGOs shuttered.

By 2021, Turkey’s press freedom remained severely restricted, and Erdoğan faced no significant opposition as he moved closer to his long-sought executive presidency.

A ‘new era’ (2016–2022)

Following the 2016 coup attempt, Erdoğan tightened his grip on power. In 2017, a constitutional referendum narrowly passed, abolishing the prime minister’s office and transforming Turkey into an executive presidency, granting Erdoğan sweeping new powers.

Military operations and foreign policy shifts

Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) in northern Syria, targeting both ISIS and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Subsequent cross-border campaigns (2018, 2019, 2022) further aimed to weaken Kurdish autonomy. Meanwhile, Erdoğan positioned Turkey as a regional power, intervening in Libya, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, while blocking Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession before securing concessions.

Economic decline and domestic challenges

Since 2018, Turkey has suffered high inflation (peaking at 80%), a currency crisis, and rising public discontent over corruption and cronyism. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war worsened economic instability, though a 2020 Black Sea gas discovery and a tourism rebound provided hope.

Diplomacy and image-building

Turkey mended ties with Israel and Egypt (2020–2022) and pushed a global name change to ‘Türkiye’, seen by some as symbolic nationalism and by others as a distraction from deeper issues. Erdoğan’s ‘new era’ remains a mix of authoritarian consolidation, economic turbulence, and foreign policy ambitions.

Prospects for the future

Since Turkey’s EU accession talks began in 2005, the country has undergone dramatic transformations, both progressive and regressive, depending on perspective. A growing middle class has reshaped cities with modern infrastructure, fostering national pride among supporters — while alienating others frustrated by Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian rule.

Gone are the days when Turkey was seen as a model Muslim-majority democracy. Civil liberties have eroded, identity politics have intensified, and Erdoğan’s rhetoric — framing politics as a clash of civilizations — has fueled division. His new executive system (2018) centralized power, making him both the architect of success and the scapegoat for failure, particularly amid economic turmoil.

Looking ahead to Turkey’s centennial as a republic, the opposition has a real chance to challenge Erdoğan. Yet, if history has proven anything, underestimating his political survival skills is a mistake many have made — and paid for.